Introduction
The primary motivation for this paper is to contribute to the study of the phenomenon of stateinfluenced banking in the Russian context. While the pervasiveness of the public sector in Russia is widely recognized, it is not a simple task to document it carefully. We collect empirical data to check whether the ownership structure of the banking industry has indeed shifted in favor of statecontrolled players, which explains our interest in a more refined classification of state-influenced and state-controlled banks and in the techniques of state control over nominally private institutions.
These issues are relevant for studies of comparative efficiency and performance of institutions of different ownership types. Karas et al. [2008] found -surprisingly -that in Russia domestic private banks are not more efficient than domestic public banks. Their study relies on public bank lists contained in two different Russian sources, dated 2002 and . Since then, numerous private banks have changed hands. Moreover, we identify fairly many state-influenced banks for which the government is not a shareholder of record. For comparative purposes, the accuracy of data sample is critical, so we try to update the sample for future research.
Our second motivation was to follow up on a question posed in a BOFIT discussion paper in the early 2007: In what direction is the Russian banking industry moving? [Vernikov, 2007] . By the middle of the 2000 decade, we found parity between public sector and private sector and a suboptimal institutional equilibrium. Just three years later the situation appears substantially different, as the public sector has taken over. The direction of ownership change in Russia has clearly diverged from the path that all European transition countries (except Belarus) have followed. Banking industry structure is becoming similar to those in China and Vietnam. The domestic private sector is being eroded. It remains unclear to what extent such phenomena as quantitative lending targets, price controls over bank loans and deposits, administrative interference, and weakening of the rule of law reflect the global financial crisis or are due to public sector expansion.
A few papers on state-influenced banks in Russia have emerged since 2007. Babayev [2007] discusses key definitions related to state banking and offers a classification of public banks. Glushkova and Vernikov [2009] and Glushkova [2009] suggest a more elaborate classification distinguishing between control via state ownership, via the governance mechanism, and via other mechanisms. They also make an assessment of public sector size in terms of combined market share of public banks by the beginning of 2009. Vernikov [2009a; 2009b] offers yet another version of public bank classifications and updates market shares with July 1, 2009 data.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 gives key definitions and conventions and presents the author"s classifications of state-influenced banks. Section 3 assesses the share of the public sector in Russian banking. Section 4 describes the changes in the ownership structure of the banking industry. Section 5 places the evolution of Russian banking in an international context. Section 6 summarizes our findings and offers some suggestions for future research. The main criterion of classifying a bank as state-influenced is the degree of control over its decision-making and lending policy by state authorities and managers in charge of public capital.
Control can be exercised via equity ownership, via governance, or otherwise. As far as "grandson" entities are concerned 3 , their classifications depend on whether entities substantially influenced by the state can exert substantial influence on decisions made by owners and top-managers whose combined share of the given bank"s equity exceeds 50%. In order to identify state-influenced banks, we searched for state authorities and all kinds of public sector institutions among listed shareholders at individual banks. First we found Russia"s 200 largest institutions in terms of asset total. Then the sample was supplemented with smaller banks found to be affiliated with the government. Informa-tion sources included statutory disclosure by banks and their parent companies, annual and quarterly reports, CBR publications and websites, RBC rankings, and other publicly available sources.
We tried to organize the diverse forms of interaction between banks and the authorities into a classification scheme (see Fig.1 ). Government or a SOE appears among the bank"s minority shareholders; ASV coordinates the process of bank rehabilitation after yielding shareholder control and operational powers to a new strategic investor; Delegates from a government body or a public sector entity sit on the bank"s board of directors and can influence strategic decisions, but such influence is far from decisive and does not enable them to take key decisions single-handedly; So-called "oporniye banki" (base, supporting, pivotal banks) of ministries, public sector entities, regional or local authorities. Nominally these banks are privately-owned and run; A CBR delegate is present in the bank to oversee the use of financial assistance provided by CBR and other public authorities.
State
Our classification displayed in Fig. 1 is quite similar to that of Babayev [2007] , except for some details. Firstly, in our investigation of state control and influence over commercial banks we did not limit the scope of analysis to equity stake ownership. We obtained sufficient empirical evidence of a strong government role in banks whose controlling equity stake remains nominally in private hands (group 1.2). We assume that when looking at a society with blurred and poorly defined ownership rights, one should avoid a purely legalistic approach, which is likely to artificially limit the scope of analysis. A qualitative approach can be used instead to identify various non-evident forms of state presence and assess its true magnitude.
Secondly, Babayev covers banks for which for over 50% of the equity is held by "state corporations" and flagship banks of state-controlled groups [Babayev, 2007, p.60] . We broaden the scope by including in the sample other indirectly state-owned banks, i.e. "grandson", "grandgrandson", etc. downstream structures controlled by "state corporations" and SOEs. We presume that the state can ultimately enforce its will on such nominally private banks via a chain of intermediate owners.
Thirdly, Babayev [2007, p.60] qualifies as "state-owned" only fully (100%) state-owned banks, regardless of whether ownership is exercised directly or indirectly. We find this to be too restrictive. Rosselkhozbank would meet the criterion of 100% state ownership, but neither Sberbank nor VTB would, due to their minority holdings of equity. The broad public and the professional community always refer to both of these institutions as gosudarstvennie banki, or gosbanki (stateowned banks). The law does not specifically deal with SOCBs. We prefer to use the term "SOB" in a broader meaning that includes all state-owned banks (subgroup 1.1). Source: Author's estimate based on CBR and ASV data and formal disclosure of respective commercial banks.
Our broad sample of state-influenced banks includes 77 institutions, of which 60 are statecontrolled banks and 17 are other state-influenced banks ( Table 1) . We report that by mid-2009, 6 commercial banks were owned by federal level authorities, 13 by regional and municipal authorities, and 31 by SOEs and SOCBs; another 11 institutions were governed by the state without major equity participation. The full sample is displayed in Appendix Table A2 .
3
The size of public sector
We define market share as the percentage of total banking assets 9 held by state-controlled banks.
Market shares of other state-influenced banks are disregarded for the sake of keeping our estimates conservative. When state participation exceeded 50%, the bank"s assets were counted fully. Banks with minority state participation and not governed by the state were not included.
One can calculate "controlled assets" as a sum of multiples of each bank"s assets by the equity share:
where G is total assets controlled by the government, А i is a bank"s asset total, and S i is share of equity belonging to the state. In the Russian situation, this method may be inappropriate because we think that it would distort substance. In an economy with legal institutions and governance traditions like Russia"s only a controlling stake enables the owner to defend his interests. A blockholder can project his control over the entire assets of a bank. For instance, CBR owns no more than 57.6%
of Sberbank ordinary shares and yet government representatives enjoy full control over Sberbank and its lending policies. There is no such thing as control of assets proportional to equity stake. Unrelated minority shareholders essentially control 0% of a company 10 ..
Combined market share of predominantly state-owned banks in Russia grew from 35.9%
in January 2001 to 56% of total assets in July 2009, or by 1.6 times ( Table 2) . Adding stategoverned banks without majority state ownership raises the combined market share of the public sector to 57.1% of all banking assets. Bank for Development and Foreign Economic Affairs (Vneshekonombank, or VEB) is a financial institution that has the word "bank" in its official name but formally is not a bank but rather a "state corporation" governed by a special individual law. It is not chartered nor licensed as a bank; CBR has no regulatory power over VEB, and it is not covered in the national banking statistics. Foreign parties, however, do consider VEB to be a bank for all practical purposes, and do not hesitate to include VEB"s external assets and liabilities in statistical aggregates of the Russian banking sector.
Apart from several specific functions where VEB acts as governmental agent, VEB also performs operations that in essence do not differ from the activity of regular commercial banks. VEB lends to
Russian non-financial companies, and the bank"s IFRS reporting discloses in sufficient detail the size of its commercial-loan portfolio comprising corporate loans, pre-export financing, and project finance. We assume that in this area of its activity VEB is a lending institution that appeals to the same class of borrowers, making it a de facto competitor of other large corporate banks 11 . We estimate the commercial loan portfolio of VEB to have reached RUB577bn by mid-2009, or 2% of total assets of the official banking system. This amount is sufficient to dismiss the formal objection that VEB is not a bank. We do add VEB"s commercial loan figures to the Russian banks" totals when assessing the overall amount of bank assets under the influence of the state. We believe that this results in a fuller coverage. Table 2 by more than 0.3 percentage points.
Although our sample is representative enough 12 , we may have missed state-influenced banks as a result of poor disclosure of ownership structures and related parties, but those would be fairly small banks. The first 100 banks were screened carefully, and in Russia an institution below the top-100 cannot have a market share exceeding 0.07% and below the top-200 only 0.03%. The cumulative error should not exceed 2 percentage points of market share.
The outcome of our calculation appears to be on the high side if compared to most other sources using the same or similar indicator (Table 3) . Central Bank of Russia experts put the share of total assets held by state-controlled banks at just 40.6% 13 [CBR, 2009a] . The Raiffeisenbank research department suggests that the market share of state-controlled banks is 45.7% of total assets [Raiffeisen, 2009] , which is halfway between CBR figure and our estimate.
12 Identification of state-influenced banks is a continuous process. After the release of the previous version of this working paper in October 2009 [Vernikov, 2009a] , we identified 5 subsidiary banks of TransKreditBank; a bank owned by Alrosa, the state-controlled diamond mining company; a bank owned by Odintsovo municipality in the Moscow region and a bank governed by the administration of the Leningrad region. All these banks were added to the sample. 13 Central Bank of Russia has published more detailed information on market shares of "state-controlled banks" in specific segments such as corporate loans, loans to households, corporate deposits, household deposits, securities portfolios, and total profit/loss of the banking sector (see Table A1 in Appendix). The gap of 12.8 percentage points between the CBR figure and our estimate is material enough to require some comment. The most likely explanation is the difference in the scope of coverage and definitions. The CBR definition of a state-controlled bank is narrow; it excludes numerous banking offspring of public companies. Moreover, our most recent estimate suggests a slightly lower number than in [Glushkova, Vernikov, 2009 ] as a result of reclassification of several private banks where we fail identify a critical impact of state authorities on strategic decisions. Those banks were moved from the "state-governed" to "other state-influenced" category and were dropped form the core sample.
Changes in industry structure
State withdrawal from the commercial banking sector in the 1990s was inconsistent. Core banks never became subject to genuine privatization. Instead, there was tacit appropriation of substantial banking assets in the public sector by bank insiders. Combined with very rapid growth of greenfield private banks, that drove the market share of public sector to a low of 30% or so in 1998. After the 1998 crisis, however, the trend was definitely reversed. Public sector assets grew organically due to the greater dynamism of state-owned banks, and via takeovers of failed private banks, especially after September 2008 14 . The recent financial crisis of 2008-9 only catalyzed the process (Fig.2) . In 2006 we noted a parity between market strength of domestic private banks and public institutions and predicted that the standoff would not be sustainable [Vernikov, 2007] . It was not.
By 2009 the public sector has convincingly overtaken both the domestic private sector and foreigncontrolled banks in terms of share of total assets. A breakdown of the Russian banking sector by form of ownership is displayed in Fig.3 .
The estimate of combined market share of private actors (slightly below 45%) might be too optimistic. In Fig.3 state-governed banks are treated as nominally private, for formal reasons.
Moreover, we simplistically tend to assume that all foreign-controlled banks in Russia are private 15 .
In any case, domestic private capital stopped being the leading force in the industry. Its gradual erosion and crowding-out from the core of banking into regional and product niches continues. Natural attrition by bankruptcy and voluntary exit is complemented by business capture resulting from growing dependence of private banks on CBR and other authorities for funding and capital.
Restructuring takes place within the public sector. The number of banks majority-owned by state authorities at federal, regional or municipal levels has remained unchanged (17) in the 2000
decade. Meanwhile, the number of institutions controlled by SOEs and SOCBs has doubled from 16
to 33, and their share of all state-controlled banks" assets more than doubled from 10.7% to 23.7% (Fig.4) . Direct public ownership of banks is thus giving way to indirect ownership and control. Executive authorities delegate owner rights to related companies. We find growing evidence of multilevel holding structures with a large state-owned company or SOCB at the top of the pyramid. Each superior entity holds a controlling stake at the lower-level entity. An example of this type of control is shown in Fig.5 . The Russian state controls Gazprom, which via one of its divisions (Mezhregiongaz) owns Gazenergoprombank, which took over Sobinbank, which in turn is used to control The use of multi-level holding structures often signals entrenchment of the blockholder against outside shareholders 16 . In our case, the blockholder is not necessarily the government; it might also be the top management of SOEs. Public property invested in a subsidiary company or bank stops being public and becomes quasi-private. Public control and scrutiny over the use of public funds gets weaker with each additional tier. The bank at the end of the chain should still be regarded as public property in view of the predominantly public origin of funds at the top-level company. For all practical purposes, however, influential insiders (bank top managers, board members and the public officials who represent the authorities) treat such property and dispose of it as if it were their own private property. Use of the diluted public property by insiders is often followed by appropriation.
Concentration is increasing within the public sector. In 2001-9, the market share of the five largest state-related banking groups (Sberbank, VTB group, Gazprombank group, Rosselkhozbank, and Bank Moskvy) jumped from 34.5% to 49% of Russia"s total bank assets (Fig.6) . Another important banking group is being shaped under Vneshekononbank, which has four banking subsidiaries in Russia, one in Ukraine and one in Belarus. Of the ten largest banks by total assets, six are now public entities and only one is domestic private. prombank were spun-off from the state bank Gosbank. We observe a return to a modernized version of essentially the same system of "spetsbanki" based on a few core banks with a focus on a particular sphere of the economy or region -e.g., Rosselkhozbank (agriculture), Gazprombank (gas industry), Bank Moskvy (city of Moscow), Sberbank and VTB24 (retail), VTB (large corporate business and export financing) or TransKreditBank (railways).
Public banks now constitute a third tier of the Russian banking system, not explicitly observed in national law. What makes them a separate tier is not only access to privileges or being "too big to fail", but performance of special functions. In addition to the functions generally performed by all commercial banks, we see public banks also acting as:
providers of liquidity to banks in the lower tier, the liquidity mostly originating from public funds; vehicles designed to acquire and hold non-core industrial assets deemed as strategic by state authorities. These assets range from construction companies in Russia to a carmaker in Germany; long-term investment providers to "systemically-important" enterprises and "strategic projects", including those with a social or political dimension like sport or congress facilities; corporate raiders and vehicles of property redistribution, especially with regard to assets pledged to banks by owners against loans received; first-aid provider of funds to socially or politically sensitive ventures.
International context
We earlier suggested that reassertion of government presence in the Russian banking industry differs markedly from the general pattern in transition countries [Vernikov, 2007] . European transition countries have moved away from government banking 17 towards an internationally-open model of banking dominated by private capital, foreign or national (Fig.7) . In Russia and Belarus the share of public banks exceeds 50%, and is on the rise. These two countries now appear to be pursuing similar strategies, albeit Belarus has done it more consistently throughout the past years. Sources: Author's calculations for Russia; [Raiffeisen, 2006; level structures of corporate ownership over banks, as part of the "entrenchment" of the state and/or other insiders against external shareholders.
The number of state-owned banks has reached the level of 50. This calls for a "rationalization" of the holdings. If our hypothesis about return to the system of "spetsbanki" (state-owned specialist banks) is correct, one will soon be seeing mergers between public banks and even disposals of redundant entities. The federal budget is in deficit and needs non-oil revenues, hence divestment from banks is an option. Insiders are eager to "privatize" (read: appropriate at submarket prices) the resources that authorities have pumped into their banks in 2008-9 before bank-share prices resume growth.
The baseline scenario for the immediate future rests on current trends of strengthening of market positions held by state-controlled banks. Public funds remain the main, if not the only, source of investment and liquidity, and public banks will keep their grip on the flow of these funds.
Upside 'risk' depends on a more favorable external environment (oil price). It would give breathing space to private banks and postpone the need for severe forms of resource mobilization. Downside risk is linked to adverse market environment as well as some form of social, political or ethnic unrest that will briskly increase centralization of all resources and enhance redistributive elements in the economy and society.
We see several directions for future research:
further testing of the hypothesis that public banks are more efficient that private ones [Karas et al., 2008] , based on an upgraded definition of public banks and a broader sample; comparing growth patterns of banks representing different forms of ownership; impacts of state-controlled banks on competition in specific segments of the market for banking services (lending to medium-sized businesses; lending to small business and micro financing; mortgage lending; consumer loans; household deposits; etc.); patterns of opportunistic behavior of public bank insiders and the channel of rent extraction; causality between expansion of public property in the banking industry and revival of institutions inherent to redistributive economies, e.g. price controls and administrative resource allocation (directed lending).
